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Empirical evidence shows that fiscal multipliers depend on the state of the cycle, the nature of fiscal 
policy and the level of debt. In other words, evidence points to non-linearities in the effects of fiscal 
policy. This paper provides a framework to simultaneously assess the relevance of the fiscal space of 
the government together with other sources of non-linearities. The empirical analysis, which uses a panel 
of 13 countries between 1980 and 2014, finds that fiscal consolidations based on tax increases are in 
general self-defeating, in that they result in an increase of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Increasing taxes in 
periods of expansion has the most recessionary effect on the economy. Cutting public expenditure has 
a less pronounced effect on economic activity and can stabilize debt. This paper also discusses the 
econometrics of non-linearities. Though the literature has often adopted the local projections approach 
to derive impulse response functions, I address the potential pitfalls of this method both analytically and 
econometrically. 
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1 Introduction
The Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recession have triggered a
renewed interest in the effects of fiscal policy. At the same time, discussions
have increased regarding countries with high public debt under fiscal austerity
programs. One of the main topics of policy debates relates to the implications
that these fiscal austerity measures have for the macroeconomy, especially
when a country is in an economic downturn. This paper assesses the role of the
level of public debt in determining the size of fiscal multipliers, in a model that
also accounts for the state of the cycle and the type of fiscal stabilization when
mostly based on tax increases or on spending cuts. In addition, it indicates
the correct use of the local projections approach in non-linear environments.
Until recently, most of the literature estimated a single fiscal multiplier
without taking into account the state of the economy. Recent work (Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013), Ramey and Zubairy (2018)) investigates
whether estimates of fiscal multipliers differ depending on the state of the
business cycle. However, there are few theoretical studies that link the size of
the multiplier to economic downturns. A few exceptions are Michaillat (2014)
on the labor market and Canzoneri, Collard, Dellas and Diba (2016), who make
use of a costly financial intermediation as a financial friction and show that
fiscal multipliers are state-dependent. Some New Keynesian models, such as
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) and Woodford (2010), highlight
the importance of the phase of the business cycle and study the multiplier
effect when the economy is near the zero lower bound.
Alesina, Azzalini, Favero, Giavazzi and Miano (2016) shift the focus from
the state of the cycle, arguing that it is not simply “when” a fiscal adjustment
happens that matters (i.e. recessions versus expansions), but also “how” it
happens (i.e. expenditure-based versus tax-based). Accounting for heteroge-
neous effects is critical, since the size of the multiplier can be more relevant
in circumstances of economic downturns, even more so when a country has a
high level of debt.
The fiscal space of the government is relevant when the fiscal authority
decides to implement a new fiscal consolidation, since a different position at
the Laffer curve could have different implications in the transmission of fiscal
policy. The main goal of this paper is to simultaneously study these non-
linearities and contribute to the ongoing debate about the time-varying effect
of fiscal shocks on the macroeconomy. Therefore, I propose a general model
that provides enough flexibility to account for different non-linearities. In this
paper, I focus on three non-linearities. The first arises from the state of the
economy, i.e. recessions versus expansions. The second is the composition
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of the fiscal consolidation, i.e. tax-based versus expenditure-based. The third
and novel non-linearity in the state-dependent literature arises from the gov-
ernment’s fiscal position, i.e. high-debt ratio versus low-debt ratio.
The recent literature on state-dependent multipliers (e.g. Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012) (AG in what follows)) uses the smooth transition vector
autoregression (STVAR) model.1 This is a regime-switching model, based on
a logistic distribution that controls for the transition from one regime to the
other, with weights computed as a moving average of GDP growth. Nickel and
Tudyka (2014) estimate fiscal multipliers taking into account countries’ fiscal
positions. They augment a panel vector autoregression model and introduce
debt through an interaction term, the interacted panel vector autoregression
(IPVAR). I propose a blend of these two models (STVAR and IPVAR), the
interacted smooth transition vector autoregression (ISTVAR) model. This
model is a flexible way to condition endogenously on countries’ government
debt and examine the relevance of the instrument of stabilization that the
government uses, taking into account the state of the economy. Differently
from Nickel and Tudyka (2014), I endogenously track the dynamics of debt by
explicitly modelling the evolution of the government debt-to-GDP as a function
of the interest rate payments on the debt and the primary government deficit
(Favero and Giavazzi (2007)). Therefore, I contribute to the state-dependent
literature of fiscal policy not only by looking into the stabilization instrument
that the fiscal authority uses, but by including debt itself.
I study cases of high and low debt as well as the potential of heterogeneous
effects of tax- and expenditure-based fiscal consolidations implemented in bad
and good times. My results indicate that there are heterogeneous implications
at different stages of the business cycle when I condition on debt and account
for the composition (expenditure-based, tax-based) of fiscal adjustments. The
question is which heterogeneity is more relevant: Is it the “how” — the way
the stabilization is performed? Is it the “when” — the phase of the cycle? Or
is it the “initial condition” of the economy — namely, debt — that plays the
most pivotal role and potentially constrains fiscal policy under all the different
dimensions?
My findings indicate that, first of all, the initial level of debt and the com-
position of the fiscal adjustment are the most relevant non-linearities. Second,
I find that the effects of tax-based adjustments are on average more recession-
ary when they are implemented during an economic upturn. The reason is
1In AG (2012) the identification of exogenous shifts in fiscal variables is obtained using
the Blanchard-Perotti identification assumptions. This paper uses a narrative identification
approach.
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that, when the economy is in recession, the probability of being in a recession-
ary regime is already close to 1. When debt is high, tax-based consolidations
appear to be self-defeating. Instead of reducing the deficit, they deliver on av-
erage higher debt ratios because the negative effect on GDP growth is larger
from the budget changes. Third, expenditure cuts, have a less pronounced ef-
fect on output. But, importantly, they are able to stabilize debt independently
of the state of the cycle.
Existing empirical evidence (e.g. Favero and Giavazzi (2007)) shows that
omitting debt can bias the evaluation of the output effects of fiscal policy. In
my context, when the state of public finances is weak, this triggers a fiscal
consolidation. On the one hand, this consolidation episode improves the pri-
mary balance of the government. On the other hand, it has a negative effect
on the output growth. In addition, in future periods, this adjustment may
constrain the future path of taxes and spending, since the government’s bud-
get constraint should eventually be respected. Including debt allows me to
account precisely for these different channels and observe whether the fiscal
authority succeeds in meeting its objective (i.e. to shore up fiscal sustainabil-
ity) depending upon the instrument of stabilization, the initial condition of
debt and the state of the economy.
The second contribution of this paper is a discussion of the econometrics of
non-linearities in fiscal policy. Most of the recent fiscal and monetary policy
literature adopts the Jordà (2005) local projections approach to derive im-
pulse response functions (IRFs). The main advantage of the local projections
method is that it is a very simple, non-parametric way to estimate impulse
responses. In addition, it is robust to misspecifications. It is also argued that
this approach is flexible enough to accommodate non-linear specifications. In
this paper, I argue that the way the fiscal policy literature uses this method
to account for non-linearities may be problematic. When non-linearities are
modelled through a logistic function, there is an endogenous feedback in the
system, which makes the model history-dependent.2 Therefore, the derivation
of IRFs from local projections is not simply an extension of the linear case,
which is history-independent. I discuss the potential pitfalls generated by the
way this estimation method has been used in the presence of non-linearities.
I do so both econometrically and analytically.
Econometrically, I use the STVAR model. Unlike AG (2013), I do not use
the local projections approach.3 Instead, I estimate a STVAR and use gener-
2Not just a logistic function, but more in general a function of an endogenous variable.
3I mainly refer to Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) who were the first to make use of
this approach in fiscal policy. They claim that the IRFs calculated with the local projections
method are equivalent to the ones derived from the conventional approach (STVAR). Going
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alized impulse response functions, which allow for the endogenous transition
of the economy from one state to the other. When AG derive their IRFs for
each state, they assume that the economy always remains in the same state.
I provide evidence that the dynamics of the IRFs from the STVAR approach
are different compared to the local projections approach. I run a Monte Carlo
experiment to support my argument. Analytically, I prove, within a simple
non-linear model, that the two approaches are not equivalent.
I also conduct out-of-sample simulations and evaluate the performance of
the IRFs derived from my model. This allows me to compare the simulated to
the actual effects of new episodes for the years 2009-2013, which were years of
crisis. More precisely, I use data up to 2008 to estimate my models, and then
I simulate them out-of-sample over the years 2009-2013. In this way, I am
able to compare the actual realization of GDP growth to simulated outcomes,
conditioning on the actual fiscal changes that were adopted. The out-of-sample
simulations of my STVAR baseline model perform rather well.
To sum up, this paper contributes to the literature in two ways: First, I
study relevant type of non-linearities in a general regime-switching model that
allows responses to vary with the state of the cycle, the composition of the
fiscal adjustment and the degree of indebtedness.4 Second, I discuss the use
of local projections in the state-dependent literature.
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section of the paper, I de-
scribe what motivates my research and provide a literature review. In Section
3, I present a general model which indicates what follows. Section 4 presents
the data and discusses the three types of non-linearities. The proposed model
specification is introduced in Section 5. The results are included in Section
6. Section 7 provides the discussion related to the derivation of the impulse
response functions from the different methodologies together with the Monte
Carlo experiment. Section 8 provides some robustness checks. Section 9 con-
cludes.
beyond this literature, this methodology has also been applied recently in the study of
state-dependent monetary policy.
4My paper focuses on contractionary shocks, I do not study cases of fiscal stimulus.
As Barnichon and Matthes (2018) point out, contractionary multipliers are different from
expansionary multipliers, hence the sign matters.
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2 Related Literature
The size of the fiscal multiplier has been broadly studied in the theoretical
and empirical literature. Quantification is controversial. Answers vary and
depend, to some extent, on the methodology, the nature of the shock, the
identification scheme and the data.
There are two main strands of identification in the empirical literature: the
structural VAR approach (e.g. Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Mountford and
Uhlig (2009)) and the narrative approach (e.g. Ramey and Shapiro (1998),
Romer and Romer (2010)). An issue of the standard structural identification
(SVAR) approach is the problem of non-fundamentalness in the estimation
of fiscal shocks since this approach relies on current and past shocks. This
problem is related to the fiscal foresight phenomenon. In this approach the in-
formation of news shocks and their future changes is not embedded. Therefore,
the sets of information held by the econometrician and economic agents are not
aligned. On the other hand, the narrative approach allows for the direct iden-
tification of exogenous shocks from past budget accounts, fiscal changes that
were announced as a response to past economic conditions. For this reason,
the narrative approach provides a way to take into account the information
that influences the expectations of economic agents.
Devries, Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2011) constructed an important
dataset for 17 OECD countries for the period 1978-2009 of tax and spending
changes, similar to the Romer and Romer (2010) approach. Their narrative
record includes contemporaneous changes with the aim to reduce the budget
deficit. These changes are considered exogenous because they are measures
taken as a response to past economic conditions and not to prospective ones.
Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2014) study the effects of these unanticipated
narratively identified shocks on macroeconomic variables. Alesina, Favero and
Giavazzi (2015) extend the Devries, Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2011)
dataset and distinguish between expected and unexpected fiscal corrections.
This allows them to study the impact of unanticipated and anticipated fiscal
changes on the macroeconomy.
Until recently the literature, as the aforementioned papers, had focused on
the effect of a single multiplier, and had not distinguished between the phases
of the business cycle. Recent studies have relaxed the assumption of a homo-
geneous multiplier across different states of the economy and seek to study
non-linearities of the multiplier in different regimes. AG (2012) employed a
STVAR model to study the size of the fiscal multiplier in recessions and ex-
pansions in an SVAR (Blanchard and Perotti (2002)) identification context for
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the US economy. AG (2013) employ a similar methodology by using narrative
data of OECD countries. They estimate their model with the local projections
method (Jordà (2005)).5 AG discuss a simple linear model and show that the
IRFs that one derives from the conventional approach are equivalent to the
IRFs that one can get from the local projections method. They compute the
local projections for each horizon as a separate regression; they claim that
this permits them to construct IRF and accommodate non-linearities without
imposing dynamic restrictions as is the case in other regime switching models.
This is what motivates the methodological part of my contribution, in which
I discuss more in depth the way AG use local projections. The conclusion in
both papers (AG (2012, 2013)) is that the multipliers in different regimes dif-
fer. Ramey and Zubairy (2014, 2018) also adopt the local projections method
in a state-dependent model to examine the possibility of a different response of
government spending changes in periods of recessions compared to expansions.
Ramey and Zubairys’ results show that there is no evidence of heterogeneity.
They both focus on government spending shocks. However, it is important to
mention that while the state variable for Auerbach and Gorodnichenko is a
function of an endogenous variable (moving average of GDP), for Ramey and
Zubairy their state is a dummy variable (which is 1 if the unemployment rate
is above a specific threshold, i.e. 6.5%, and 0 otherwise). The importance
of this point will be clear when we discuss the use of the local projections
method.
The above seminal papers have motivated many recent studies in this liter-
ature. Barnichon and Matthes (2018), for example, study whether the sign of
a government spending shock matters. They find that an expansionary multi-
plier is below one, while the contractionary is above 1. My paper contributes
to the empirical literature of the study of fiscal multipliers by examining the
potential for heterogeneous effects when one considers three dimensions of non-
linearities related to the “how”, the “when” and the “initial condition” that
an episode of fiscal adjustment is implemented. Several studies (e.g. Favero
and Giavazzi (2007), Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Vegh (2013), Corsetti, Meier and
Müller (2013)) have highlighted the importance of the government’s fiscal
position of a country. Omitting this dimension can bias the effects of fiscal
shocks. Nickel and Tudyka (2014) estimate fiscal multipliers and take into
account the countries’ fiscal position. They use an interacted panel vector
autoregression in a sample of European countries. Huidrom, Kose, Lim and
Ohnsorge (2016) is a recent paper that jointly accounts for the fiscal position
and the business cycle, as I do. The main differences rely on the fact that I
5I provide a brief review of the paper and the methodology in Section 7.
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include debt endogenously in my model, and on the composition of the sta-
bilization episodes. They use a Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identification
scheme.
I use the idea of the IPVAR model into the STVAR model, which I call
ISTVAR. The implementation of this model allows me to study the three dif-
ferent type of asymmetries (i.e. recessions and expansions, expenditure-based
and tax-based, high-debt and low-debt) simultaneously. I track endogenously
the dynamics of public debt-to-gdp ratio by explicitly including an equation
of debt. I follow the paper of Favero and Giavazzi (2007) and model debt as
a function of the average cost of debt and the primary deficit.
3 The General Model
My goal in this paper is to provide a general encompassing framework
to simultaneously assess the relevance of different sources of non-linearities.
To study non-linearities in the effects of fiscal policy I need a dynamic model
which can account for:
1. the behavior of the macroeconomic variables of interest (Yt) and
2. the behavior of the policy variables under study (Pt).
The macroeconomic variables (e.g. real gdp growth, consumption, etc.)
are typically assumed to be a function of both their own past values, the past
values of the policy variables and any exogenous adjustments or deviations of
the fiscal authority from its rule. These functions can potentially be non-linear
and depend on different economic conditions.
At the same time, the policy variables respond to the change of the fis-
cal authority rule, as well as through a potential feedback effect from the
past policy decisions together with the effect arising from the response of the
macroeconomic variables. A general framework that can describe the joint
evolution of the two sets of variables is:
Yt = f1 (Yt−1, Pt−1, shockt; Φ1) + u1t (1)
Pt = f2 (Yt−1, Pt−1, shockt; Φ2) + u2t.
The vector Yt represents the vector of macroeconomics variables for t = 1, 2, ..., T
years, whereas Pt represents the set of policy variables. This, for example, can
be a fiscal policy rule as a reaction function to a monetary policy shock. In
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my study the policy rule is the debt-to-gdp ratio. Φj, with j = 1, 2, are the
parameters that we need to estimate. The functions fj need to be defined
according to the question under study, to account for either linear or non-
linear responses. The choice of the functions clearly depends on the question
of interest. At the same time, it depends on the policy rule and the number of
macroeconomic variables included in the system (and vice-versa). The reason
is that the scarcity of the data, especially when one uses a narrative record of
identified shocks, puts some limits to the degrees of freedom and the number
of parameters that can be estimated.
Once all the necessary components of the model are specified, one can pro-
ceed with the estimation of the model (e.g. via seemingly unrelated regression
equations or maximum likelihood) and the derivation of impulse response func-
tions. The derivation of the impulse response functions can be done through
the generalized impulse response function, which I discuss in Section 5. The
last step, concerns the calculation of fiscal multipliers as the ratio of the inte-
gral of the output response to the integral of the policy adjustment.
The above general encompassing model sets the base for the analysis that
follows.
4 Data and Non-Linearities
4.1 Data
I make use of the narrative record initially constructed by Devries, Gua-
jardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2011) and extended by Alesina, Favero and Gi-
avazzi (henceforth AFG). The dataset consists of a time series of fiscal consol-
idations of 17 OECD countries. The countries included in the initial data are
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United King-
dom, United States, for the period 1980 to 2014. Motivated by the literature
of the narrative identification approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and
Romer and Romer (2010), AFG examine historical records available in offi-
cial documents (Budget Reports, Budget Speeches, Central Banks Reports,
Convergence and Stability Programs submitted by EU governments to Eu-
ropean Commission, IMF Reports, OECD economic surveys) to identify the
size, timing and principal motivation behind any fiscal action taken by each
government. The fiscal alterations are measured as a percentage of GDP. As
in Devries, Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2011), the focus is restricted to
the identification of fiscal changes that are exogenous to the economic cycle,
9






















































































Figure 1: Country-specific narrative unanticipated (blue) and anticipated (red)
fiscal adjustments.
as well as changes that are motivated by the willingness to reduce government
deficit. This implies that a fiscal consolidation with the goal of restraining
domestic demand or any other countercyclical policy is not included in the
dataset. Figure 1 shows the aggregate narratively identified unanticipated
and anticipated episodes for each country.
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Figure 2: EB (blue) and TB (grey) episodes and the per capita GDP growth series
(black line).
The classification of fiscal consolidations as tax-based (TB) or expenditure-
based (EB) is based on the spirit of the work of Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi
(2015) and will be discussed in the next section. The difference is that I
do not include all the paths of future announcements of fiscal adjustments.
I consider just the unanticipated and anticipated legislative announcements
that are implemented the same year.6,7 Figure 2 depicts the EB and TB fiscal
narratively identified shocks together with the GDP growth. The initial sample
consists of 17 countries, but after performing some exogeneity tests I drop three
countries: Finland, Netherlands and Sweden. In addition, I drop Germany
because data are available after 1991, due the unification, and this restricts
my analysis. My final sample includes a total of 74 episodes for taxes and
101 episodes for government spending. The main macroeconomic variables of
interest in my baseline specification are real GDP, government spending, which
is primary government spending (total government spending net of interest
payments on debt), government revenues (current receipts), the average cost
of debt and inflation. The frequency of observations is annual. My primary
data source is the OECD.
6The challenge of the narrative data is that there is often a lack of information. Gov-
ernments do not make legislative announcements on a frequent basis, hence there are many
“zeros” in the data. This phenomenon is even stronger when one accounts for the future
implementation of fiscal changes. The exclusion of the future announcements does not cre-
ate any bias. Notice that in general most of the plans of announcements have a one year
horizon (on average TB plans last around 1.5 years, and EB plans 1.8 years), which is the
information that I include in my sample.
7This is in line with the work of Devries, Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2011).
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In my general model, public debt plays the role of the main policy variable.
In the next subsection, I present the construction of this series. I use the
general government debt as a percent of GDP from the WEO of the IMF as
a reference series. The histogram of Figure 3 shows the distribution of the
government debt data of my sample. In my analysis, those data serve as the
initial values of the implicit debt-to-GDP ratio.











Figure 3: The distribution of fiscal position during the period 1980-2014. Debt-to-
GDP ratio (x-axis), Frequency in % (y-axis).
4.2 Non-Linearities
4.2.1 State of the Economy
The first asymmetry of interest in my study arises from the state of the
economy, namely if an economy is in recession or expansion. I follow Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013) and I use a regime indicator that is based on
a logistic function, which I denote as F (zit). F (zit) indicates the probability
of being in a recessionary regime. This is the key ingredient which allows me to
smoothly endogenize in my model the possibility of the economy to move from
one state to another and at the same time to track the feedback (as Caggiano,
Castelnuovo, Colombo and Nodari (2015)) after a fiscal adjustment.
In my baseline specification the logistic function is a function of the two-
year moving average of GDP growth and takes the following form
F (zit) =
exp [−γizit]
1 + exp [−γizit]
, γi > 0. (2)
12
Following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, I denote by z the growth rate of




is GDP growth for country ι = 1, .., 13 at time t = 1, . . . , 35. I use as an index
of the business cycle the standardized measure of zit.
γi is the parameter that controls the smoothness of the transitions from
one regime to another for each country. In general, large values are associated
with immediate switches, while smaller ones imply a smoother transition. γi
is calibrated in a way that matches the frequency and duration of recessions in
an economy. The economy spends an x% of time in a recessionary regime ac-
cording to the OECD dates. My goal is to calibrate γi to match this frequency.
For example, for the US Pr ((zit) > 0.8 = 0.2), where I define an economy to
be in a recession if F (zit) > 0.8. Thus, this implies that I need to set γi = 1.5.
Therefore, the magnitude of γi is in line with estimates of logit regressions
of the OECD recession dates on the measure of z for all the countries in my
sample.
The OECD dates are available from the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint
Louis. These dates are based on the OECD Composite Leading Indicator
(CLI). The series of the CLI is based on the growth cycle approach, where
business cycles and turning points are identified through a deviation from the
trend method. The recession dates are available in quarterly data, are not
seasonally adjusted and are recorded as a dummy variable (1: for recession, 0:
for expansion). I have yearly data on the narratively identified shocks, hence I
translate the quarterly recession series of each country into a yearly recession
series.
The general rule that I follow to calibrate γi for each country is that
Pr ((zit) > 0.8 = xi). Figure 4 shows the comparison of the constructed tran-
sition series to the OECD recession dates associated with the economic down-
turns of the 13 economies of the sample. The country-specific gammas are
presented in Table 1. On average, the average economy spends 18% of its
time in a recessionary regime.
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Figure 4: Recession dates (shaded grey area) and the weight F(z) on the recession
regime (black line).
Table 1: Calibration of smoothness parameter γ
Country Duration of Recessions γ Country Duration of Recessions γ
AUS 14% 1.14 GBR 19% 1.43
AUT 14% 1.53 IRL 14% 1.68
BEL 14% 1.13 ITA 22% 2.24
CAN 17% 1.09 JPN 17% 1.65
DNK 19% 1.72 PRT 22% 1.60
ESP 25% 1.70 USA 17% 1.56
FRA 14% 1.59
4.2.2 Type of Fiscal Consolidation
The second asymmetry reflects the possible importance of the compo-
sition of the fiscal adjustment. Views about the relative effect of taxes or
government spending differ among public debates and policymakers. Devries,
Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2011) in their narrative record identify fiscal
14
policy changes that are based either on taxes or government spending. Instead
of directly including in my specification the tax and government spending ad-
justments, I follow Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi (2015) and take into account
the fact that the different nature of changes may be correlated. In this way, I
consider the entire fiscal adjustment that the fiscal authority implements, that
consists of tax changes and government spending changes together. Then, I
classify an adjustment as being tax-based (expenditure-based), if it is mainly
based on tax increases (spending cuts), namely if the sum of the unanticipated
and anticipated components of the tax changes (spending changes) is greater
than the respective sum of the unanticipated and anticipated components of
the government spending changes (tax changes).
4.2.3 Government Debt
Figure 5 shows the government debt as a percent of GDP series of the
different OECD countries. From this figure it is possible to observe that coun-
tries like Belgium, Italy and Japan belong always in the group of countries
with higher government debt. On the other hand, Portugal and the United
States, for example, are cases that switch from being higher to lower (or vice
versa). This means that it is not possible to fix ex-ante the countries that
would be classified as belonging in a group of “higher-” or “lower-” debt coun-
tries. The Interacted Smooth Transition VAR (ISTVAR), which is presented
in Section 5.2, is a flexible way to endogenously model debt, without grouping
countries into a higher or lower debt category.
15
Figure 5: Debt-to-GDP ratio (Figure from the OECD website).
I adopt the idea of Favero and Giavazzi (2007) to model debt in a way that
mimics the government’s budget constraint.
Debtit =
1 + iit
(1 + πit) (1 + ∆yit)
Debtit−1 + (exp(git)− exp(τ it)) . (3)
i stands for the average cost of government debt, π is the inflation rate, g
is government spending and τ is government revenues.8,9 The debt-to-GDP
ratio is, in this way, determined by the macroeconomic variables that are
8With a small abuse of notation, i denotes both the interest rate and indexes the country
under consideration. Nevertheless, no confusion should arise given that country-indexes
always occur as subscripts.
9I take the exponential of the government to gdp and taxes to gdp ratios, because these
variables are in logarithms.
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Figure 6: Observed Debt-to-GDP (data) versus the simulated series.
included in my specification. Figure 6 shows evidence that with the above
equation (3) I manage to track well the debt-to-GDP ratio observed in the
data. Differences may be due to the presence of seigniorage, which is not
considered in my framework, the possible existence of stock-flow adjustments
that lead to some measurement error, or due to approximation errors, since I
use logarithms for the GDP growth rate and the inflation rate. For Australia,
the fact that I combine different data sources to construct the series due to
limited availability of data, may also explain why the implicit series does not
match the observed series of the debt ratio.
To understand better the insights of this identity I split (3) into two com-
ponents: a. the so-called snowball effect ( 1+iit
(1+πit)(1+∆yit)
Debtit−1 ) and b. the
primary balance effect. Those represent the two channels that affect the evo-
lution of debt following a consolidation episode. For example, suppose that
the government reduces its expenditure by 1% of GDP. This implies a neg-
ative output effect and an increase in government spending. In terms of a.,
the decrease of output growth, for a given past value of debt and a given i,
implies an increase on the debt-ratio. However, in terms of b., the expenditure
reduction has a direct impact on the primary balance, which improves, and
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reduces the debt-ratio.10 Therefore, debt will increase or decrease depending
on the synergy that eventually dominates.
5 Model Specification
5.1 The Fiscal Smooth Transition VAR with Debt
My aim in this paper is to account for the three non-linearities and study their
relevance to the transmission of fiscal policy. To illustrate this, I adopt the
general model that I presented in Section 3, where I introduce the asymmetries
of interest (i.e. state of the economy, type of fiscal consolidation, government
debt). To make model (1) functional I need to specify the different sets of
variables and functional forms. My baseline framework with the three non-
linearities reads as follows:
Yit = (1− F (zit))×
[
















+ λi + χt + uit (4)
Debtit =
1 + iit
(1 + πit) (1 + ∆yit)
Debtit−1 + (exp(git)− exp(τ it))
F (zit) =
exp [−γizit]
1 + exp [−γizit]
, γi > 0.
Relating to model (1), Y includes the key macroeconomic variables:
Y = [∆y ∆τ ∆g i π],
where ∆y is GDP growth, ∆τ is the change of government revenues, ∆g is the
change of government spending, i is the average cost of government debt and π
is the inflation rate. λi and χt are country and time fixed effects respectively.
The error term uit is distributed as a Normal N (0,Σu), and i = 1, . . . , N in-
dexes countries and t = 1, . . . , T indexes time. The policy variable includes
10The effect on output has a further indirect effect on the primary balance, which arises
from the automatic stabilizers. In addition, there is potentially a third channel through the
interest rate payments. In my discussion, I will focus on the main effects of a. and b.
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the debt-ratio and is specified by (3). For this policy variable, I do not in-
clude an error term since, as I discussed in the previous section, this is an
identity.11 eEBit and e
TB
it stand for the narratively identified shocks (defined as
shocks in model (1)). My specification distinguishes between the instrument
of stabilization, expenditure-based (eEBit = e
IMF
it ·EBit) and tax-based (eTBit =
eIMFit ·TBit) narrative shocks, which are unanticipated and anticipated shocks
implemented the same year.12 In this model I assume that all the macroeco-
nomic variables depend on the cycle, i.e. f1 which in my case is the logistic
function (2).13 I follow Granger and Terasvirta (1993) for the estimation of
the model.
Including debt in the study of fiscal consolidations is important. Indeed,
the aim of the narratively identified fiscal consolidations is to reduce public
deficits. At the same time, the state of the public finances may not just trigger
some episodes of fiscal adjustment, but may also have a direct impact on output
growth through a different channel as I discussed in the introduction. Omitting
debt may bias the magnitude of the consolidation effects.14 The reason is that
the short lags of ∆τ , ∆g, i and π alone are incapable of tracing the evolution of
the debt-ratio accurately enough. Favero and Giavazzi (2007) show that debt
in (3) is the result of long and non-linear dynamics.15 Since debt plays the
role of the “initial condition” that the economy stands, the model dynamics
are going to depend on it. This means that the initial value of the state of the
economy and the initial value of the government’s fiscal position matter for
the purpose of studying the different dimensions of interest. I present results
with initial values that make clear the dichotomies between a recessionary and
expansionary regime (approximately 0.8 versus 0.2 as discussed in the previous
11Of course, one could include an error term to account for measurement error, given the
discrepencies that may arise as I discussed in the previous section and are observed in a
couple of countries.
12eIMFit stands for the the total adjustment, which includes tax and government spending
changes. Whereas EBit and TBit are dummy variables for expenditure-based or tax-based
cases respectively. An episode is recorded as expenditure-based (tax-based) when the total of
expenditure-changes (tax-changes) dominate the total tax-changes (expenditure-changes).
13The linear model is a special case of STVAR for a value of γ = 0.
14I elaborate more on this argument in the appendix by discussing the econometrics.





















section) and a high versus low debt ratio (0.3 and 0.9). Those values are also
backed from Figure 3.16 It is important to stress that with this model I allow
for the possible endogenous transition of the economy from one state to the
other when a shock hits the economy, and importantly also the endogenous
feedback of debt. A flexible way that permits me to actually account and
track the transition of the economy and the debt dynamics is the use of the
Generalized Impulse Response Functions.
My aim is to study the relevance of these non-linearities in the propagation
of the fiscal adjustments.
5.2 The Interacted Smooth Transition VAR
Part of the novelty of this paper and as a further extension of model (4), I
assume that the fiscal shocks depend on the level of debt. In that, I explicitly
interact the government budget constraint, the identity (3), with the identified
consolidations. I employ a model which I call Interacted Smooth Transition
Vector Autoregression (ISTVAR):
Yit = (1− F (zit))×
[





















1 ·Debtit−1, forS = E,R and j = 1, 2,
Debtit =
1 + iit
(1 + πit) (1 + ∆yit)
Debtit−1 + (exp(git)− exp(τ it))
F (zit) =
exp [−γizit]
1 + exp [−γizit]
, γi > 0.
This model makes the non-linearity that is introduced through debt stronger,
since the effect from a fiscal adjustment in this case depends also on the in-
teraction with debt. I expect that this additional component can allow for a
better evaluation of the implications of adjustments in the study of high and
low debt.
Moreover, to understand better this specification let us recall that the aim
of the use of these fiscal adjustments, by the fiscal authority, is to decrease the
16See also footnote 27.
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public deficit. Therefore, this is a natural justification to motivate the choice
of interacting these adjustments and debt.
An “ideal” specification would account for the interaction of both the set of
macroeconomic variables and the set of the shocks. However, this translates
into a larger number of parameters to be estimated. This is where the so-
called “curse of dimensionality” hits. Especially, because of the scarcity of the
narrative data.
5.3 Generalized Impulse Response Functions
I now turn to the derivation of the impulse response functions, which
in a non-linear environment may be complicated. The derivation of impulse
responses of the variables in Yit to innovations is different from the case of a
standard VAR, due to the presence of the logistic function and of the budget
constraint. In my setting (model (1)), I compute the response of the output
growth (or the rest of the economic aggregates) to fiscal shocks via generalized
impulse response functions (Koop, Pesaran and Potter 1996), which make it
possible to endogenize the transition from one regime to the other and to track
the feedback between debt and the regime.
GIRF∆y (h,Ωt−1,shockt) = E (∆yt+h|Ωt−1,shockt = 1)−E (∆yt+h|Ωt−1,shockt = 0) ,
where Ωt−1 accounts for the history, h = 0, 1, 2 . . . , H are the horizons and
shockt represents the shock of interest, which is either the tax-based or the
expenditure-based narrative identified shock . I rely on the equation above to
derive the impulse response functions.17 The steps that I follow are:
Step 1. First, assume that the structural shock of interest (i.e. EB or TB)
hits the economy, which is equal to one, while the rest of the shocks are equal
to zero, and simulate the system forward.
Step 2. Then generate dynamically forward, an alternative simulation for
all variables, by assuming, differently from Step 1, that all the shocks are equal
to zero.
Step 3. To compute the impulse responses, take the difference between the
above simulated values of Steps (1. - 2.).
17Applying this methodology in a linear VAR would produce standard impulse responses.
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Step 4. In addition, run a correlated bootstrap method for the calculation
of the confidence intervals.18,19
I repeat the above 4 steps for all the 23 combinations of interest.20 This
methodology produces impulse responses that allow for the feedback and dy-
namics of both the state variable F (z) and Debt.
5.4 Fiscal Multipliers
The last part of the analysis involves the computation of the fiscal multipli-
ers. To calculate the cumulative fiscal multipliers I follow Uhlig (2012) and
I take the integral of the generalized impulse response of output divided by
the integral of the generalized impulse response of the fiscal policy variable of
interest (revenues or expenditures) given the adjustment under study.21 Basi-









h=1 ∆gh is for the government
expenditures.22 I rescale these changes into currency equivalents, by using the
ratio of the sample mean ratio of the expectation of output over taxes or gov-
ernment spending.23 The multipliers account for both the response of GDP
growth together with the response of taxes and government spending on the
shock of interest, which can give a sense of the synergies that propagate back
to the economic system and affect debt and output.
18I report the 16-84% confidence intervals.
19For my bootstrap, I re-sample the residuals of the estimated non-linear VAR (e.g. model
4) allowing for the correlation between the residuals of the different countries. This generates
a set of observations for Y, F (z) , Debt, which allows me to re-estimate my model and derive
the GIRFs. I rely on 1000 iterations.
20The combinations are: TB shock in recession (F (z) = 0.8) when debt is high (0.9); EB
shock in recession (F (z) = 0.8) when debt is high ( 0.9 ); TB shock in expansion (F (z) = 0.2)
when debt is high (0.9); EB shock in expansion (F (z) = 0.2) when debt is high (0.9); TB
shock in recession (F (z) = 0.8) when debt is low ( 0.9 ); EB shock in recession (F (z) = 0.8)
when debt is low (0.3); TB shock in expansion (F (z) = 0.2) when debt is low (0.3); TB
shock in expansion (F (z) = 0.2) when debt is low (0.3). I set for each case the initial values
for debt, the regime indicator, and all the related initial parameters.
21Uhlig discounts those integrals, which I do not. This does not change the results.
22This implies that the available number of multipliers that one can compute is 23, given
the different nonlinearities.
23Recall that the variables of interest are in logarithms and in real terms.
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6 Results
6.1 The Fiscal STVAR with Debt (Model 4)
In Section 4 (Figure 3), I presented how the government debt-to-GDP ratio
is distributed along the different percentiles.24 My econometric specification
make it possible to examine the size of the effects of the coefficients at specific
values of the fiscal position from the percentiles of the sample. Initial condi-
tions matter for the dynamics of the generalized impulse response functions. I
present the impulse response functions together with the endogenous response
of debt and the transition of the state of the economy for model (4).25,26,27
In Figure 7 and 8 I illustrate the cumulative impulse response functions
of the main macroeconomic variables. I focus on the response of the output
growth, for scenarios of low and high debt respectively.28 In addition, the
innovative feature of my model is that I can track the endogenous feedback
of the debt-ratio, as well as, the endogenous response of the state indicator.
Debt is low at a value of 30%, whereas debt is high at the value of 90%.29 My
results represent the behavior of the average country in my sample.
When debt is low, Figure 7 shows that the fiscal effects on output growth
generated through increases in taxes are state-dependent. Adjustments that
are mainly composed through taxes and are implemented in boom periods
have the most recessionary effect. This is statistically different from the same
type of consolidations when implemented in periods of recessions, which ap-
pear to be less recessionary. It appears that in bad times, when the economy
underperforms and things go bad, they cannot get much worse. The state of
24I drop Japan from my study, since it is the only country in my sample with such high
debt-ratios.
25I do not depict the confidence intervals of the response of F(z) and debt. The reason is
that they are pretty narrow and we prefer to keep the picture of the graph more clear given
that there are many curves presented together.
26Differently from AG, I allow for the endogenous transition from one regime to the other
(F (z)). As it has been already stressed by Caggiano, Castelnuovo, Colombo and Nodari
(2015), this is an important point to highlight. Therefore, I document the response of F (z)
starting in recession versus the one starting in expansion.
27The estimated coefficients (with their standard errors and the t-statistics) for the equa-
tions of output growth, taxes and spending, are available upon request.
28I present the results for output, since later I present also the multipliers.
29One reason that I choose to present results for these values, is that these values are
associated with the point of the tails of my sample distribution as depicted in Figure 3. In
addition, the 90% value reflects the discussion of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) that provide
evidence of a negative impact of growth when the level of debt ratio is above this threshold.
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TB shock: GIRF of GDP growth






EB shock: GIRF of GDP growth



















Endogenous response of Debt
Figure 7: Cumulative GIRFs for the Fiscal STVAR with LOW Debt: The output
growth response on a tax-based shock or an expenditure-based shock in recessions
or expansions when the Debt-ratio is low.
the cycle seems to matter also when stabilizations are mainly implemented
through increases in government spending. In this case, in periods of expan-
sions the effect on output is almost negligible. In terms of the endogenous
response of the transition variable, for all the cases convergence to the as-
sumed probability “target” is observed, which is that the economy spends on
average 20% of the time in a recessionary regime. This is not the case when we
turn to high debt, where the economy converges in a more recessionary target
where the “target” indicates a probability of being 50-60% in a recessionary
regime.
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Endogenous response of Fz











Figure 8: Cumulative GIRFs for the Fiscal STVAR with HIGH Debt: The output
growth response on a tax-based shock or an expenditure-based shock in recessions
or expansions when the Debt-ratio is high.
In Figure 8, when the debt-ratio is high and the phase of the cycle is
low, tax changes are self-defeating on average. They bring the debt-ratio to
higher levels and the economy converges in a recessionary regime. Output
growth falls on impact, and even if there is a sign of recovery after one year, it
remains in a recessionary regime. Interestingly, on the other hand, government
spending adjustments have a stabilizing feedback to debt. Especially, when
an expenditure-based fiscal consolidation is implemented during good periods,
this leads on average into a negligible response of the output growth. At the
same time, it reduces the debt-ratio. Therefore, there is a stabilizing feedback
on the economic system.
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6.2 The Interacted-STVAR (Model 5)
In this subsection, I present the results for the ISTVAR model (5); when
an adjustment is implemented it is interacted also with the level of debt.
When debt is low, from Figure 9, the fiscal effects on output growth generated
through increases in taxes are state-dependent, as before. However, this is not
the case for expenditure-based consolidations.







TB shock: GIRF of GDP growth






EB shock: GIRF of GDP growth



















Endogenous response of Debt
Figure 9: Cumulative GIRFS for the ISTVAR with LOW Debt: The output growth
response on a tax-based shock or an expenditure-based shock in recessions or ex-
pansions when the Debt-ratio is low.
When debt is high (Figure 10), compared to the previous results, it is in-
teresting to observe that now also an increase of taxes in periods of expansions
is self-defeating. The tax shock increases public debt, which remains on an
upward trajectory in the subsequent horizons.
26





























Endogenous response of Fz





Endogenous response of Debt
Figure 10: Cumulative GIRFS for the ISTVAR with HIGH Debt: The output
growth response on a tax-based shock or an expenditure-based shock in recessions
or expansions when the Debt-ratio is high.
To sum up, considering the three types of asymmetries coming from the
“when”- the state of the cycle, the “how”- the composition of the fiscal instru-
ment, the “initial condition” - the level of debt, it appears that the “initial
condition” and the “how” matter the most.30 Policies implemented through
expenditure-based adjustments seem to harm the economy less and are effec-
tive regarding their objective. They are able to stabilize, and even reduce debt.
The picture is different when ones looks into a composition of policies based on
tax increases. The distortionary flavour that taxes have, generate an opposite
effect from the one that a government of a country would desire. Two factors
can explain the increase in public debt, especially in periods of recessions: 1)
the negative effect on the output growth and 2) the contemporaneous increase
30Econometrically, one could also examine whether the “when”, the “how”,
or the “initial condition” is more relevant by testing different hypothesis.
Hypothesis Testing
Cycle B1E = B1R ; B2E = B2R
Composition B1E = B2E ; B1R = B2R








of government spending, which offsets the positive effect of higher revenues on
the primary balance. This can be better understood by looking into the debt
accumulation equation (3).
In general, the government can engage in decreasing the stock of public debt
either by increasing its revenue, by the use of distortionary income taxation, or
by reducing its expenditures, for example services that operate as a substitute
for private consumption. In terms of policy implications, cutting expenditure
seems to be more advisable, since it is less harmful for the economy. A cut in
expenditure may reduce the distortion of taxes, since this may imply a decrease
of taxation. This can be interpreted as a demand shock in the economy, and
for this reason the effect on gdp growth is less pronounced.31
6.2.1 The Cumulative Fiscal Multipliers
Table 2 and Table 3 report the five-year cumulative fiscal multipliers for out-
put. The difference from the output dynamic cumulative multipliers depicted
in the previous section through the generalized impulse response functions
is that now we also consider the indirect effect of the change of government
revenues or government expenditures on output arising from tax-based and
expenditure-based adjustments. Instead, in the section before we saw the di-
rect effect of tax-based and expenditure-based adjustments on output. The
multipliers obtained when debt is low or high differ. For the high-debt case
the government spending cumulative multipliers range between [−0.54,−0.49],
while the tax multipliers between [−1.16,−0.49]. A one percentage-point de-
cline of government spending as a ratio to GDP, coming from a TB or EB
adjustment, is associated with an output of contraction. The contraction is on
average smaller compared to the government revenues multiplier, but in most
of the cases - when we consider the confidence intervals- the two do not appear
to be statistically different. The picture is similar when we consider the case
of the low-debt ratio.
31Government spending is often wasteful. In this case the channel that I just described
would be even stronger.
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Table 2: I-STVAR: Output Multiplier from Government Revenues and Spend-
ing in the High-Debt Regime
Expansion Recession





















Table 3: I-STVAR: Output Multiplier from Government Revenues and Spend-
ing in the Low-Debt Regime
Expansion Recession




















7 State-Dependent IRFs and Local Projections
In this section, I discuss the potential pitfalls of the use of local projec-
tions in the state-dependent fiscal policy literature. For the purpose of this
discussion I will work with a simplified model, the STVAR, which accounts
for two non-linearities (i.e. the state of the cycle and the type of fiscal consol-
idation). The goal of this section is to compare the performance of the local
projections method to the GIRFS, when one introduces a non-linearity that
makes the model history-dependent. Given this objective, I restrict my focus
to the simplified model, both because it is more pedagogical and because this
is the model generally used in the recent literature.
29
7.1 The Smooth Transition VAR
For the purpose of this section, I assess the heterogeneity of the fiscal
adjustments simply through state-dependence and composition. I make use of
a tri-variate smooth transition vector autoregressive model (for an extensive
presentation see Granger and Terasvitra (1993)).


















+λi + χt + uit
F (zit) =
exp [−γizit]
1 + exp [−γizit]
, γi > 0
where Yit includes: ∆y, the GDP growth, ∆τ , the change of government rev-
enues, ∆g, the change of government spending.32 This model specification is
still distinguishing between EB and TB narrative shocks.33
Following the previous discussion, I estimate the response of the output
growth (or the rest of the economic aggregates) to fiscal shocks with the
method of the generalized impulse response functions, which makes it pos-
sible to endogenize the transition from one regime to the other.
32 ∆yit∆τ it
∆git
 = [1− F (zit)]





























33However, as a matter of ease and compactness for the discussion in the next section,
I will keep notation simple and I will denote just the aggregate fiscal shock eIMFit (for the
disaggregate case, the extension is straightforward).
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7.2 Local Projections Method
In this subsection, I first discuss the local projections approach proposed
by Jordà (2005) to derive the impulse responses. This requires running a
series of regressions for each horizon. The advantage of the local projections
method lies in the fact that it does not constrain the shape of the IRF. I
will first briefly present this approach as was introduced by Jordà for linear
specifications. Along with this brief presentation, I will refer to the limitations
of the approach, already pointed out by the author, in the case of a non-linear
specification. Then, I will move to the discussion of the state-dependent case
as was first used in the fiscal policy literature by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2013).
The simplicity of this methodology has attracted many supporters, includ-
ing researchers in fiscal policy and monetary policy. It is a flexible, model-free
methodology, robust to misspecifications, from which one easily can derive the
IRFs by running a series of regressions. In the linear case the model is
yit+h = ahxit−1 + βhe
IMF
it + λi + χt + εit+h,
for h = 0, 1, 2, . . . horizons, where y is the variable of interest, x is a vector that
includes the one lag of the growth of GDP, taxes and government spending.
eIMFit stands for the identified narrative shock (EB, TB). The set of regressions
in the above linear specification implies that the IRFs for this case are the
collections of the β coefficients of each period.
AG allow for state-dependence in a straightforward way. In this case, the
model becomes














+λi + χt + εit+h.
AG (2013) advocate that the local projections representation is equivalent to
a moving average representation. This is a potential source of concern, since
it might not hold in a non-linear environment. In fact, AG discuss the linear
case both mathematically and graphically. They show that the IRFs that one
recovers from the local projections approach are similar to the IRFs of the
conventional approach for the linear case. Then they assume that the same
should hold true for the non-linear case, and directly apply their version of
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local projections for their non-linear model. Basically, their IRFs are derived
again as a sequence of the βh ’s, estimated in a series of single regressions for
each horizon. The IRFs for AG when a shock hits the economy in periods of
recessions is the collection of the estimated βR,h and for expansions is βE,h.
7.3 The Moving Average Representation
To compute the IRFs, one typically proceeds by constructing first the
moving average representation. Recently, it has been assumed in this literature
(starting from AG) that the local projections approach is equivalent to the
moving average representation of the series.
In this section, I aim to show that the IRFs of a simple non-linear AR(1)
differ from the IRFs recovered from the local projections approach.34
Let assume a non-linear model, similar in spirit to my baseline model.
yt = αtyt−1 + ut ∀t ∈ N0. (6)
















A2 ∀t ∈ N0.









αs ∀τ ∈ {−1, 0, . . . , t} .
By convention, I set
∏t
s=τ+1 αs = 1, if τ + 1 > t. In particular, φt,t = 1.
Assume now that
yt = αtyt−1 + βte
IMF
t + ut ∀t ∈ N0. (7)

































34The proofs are provided in the appendix.
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αs ∀τ ∈ {−1, 0, . . . , t} .
By convention, I set
∏t
s=τ+1 αs = 1, if τ + 1 > t. In particular, I have that
γt,t = 1.
What is important to realize from the above result is that the computa-
tion of the IRFs in the conventional approach depends on the time-varying
coefficients which are functions of the lags of the left-hand-side variable. The
IRFs are history-dependent. This is different from the linear case, where the
above setting would imply that φτ ,t =
∏t
s=τ+1 α.
35 Therefore, in the non-linear
setting the local projections method, as has been currently and widely used in
the literature, is not equivalent to the moving average representation, which
means that the IRFs are not equivalent. This is easy to observe if one derives
the IRFs that correspond to the local projections approach à la AG.
I write the baseline model specification in a simpler way. More precisely,
I drop the i subscript, the country and time dummies, and I just include the
lag of the output growth.















35It may be easier for the reader to notice that in the linear case if one starts from the
baseline model, by substituting, one would have:
y0 = αy−1 + βe
IMF
0 + u0
y1 = αy0 + βe
IMF
1 + u1 = α
2y−1 + αβe
IMF
0 + αu0 + β1e
IMF
1 + u1
y2 = αy1 + βe
IMF





1 +αu1 + βe
IMF
2 + u2 etc.,
whereas in the state-dependent case:
y0 = α0y−1 + β0e
IMF
0 + u0
y1 = α1y0 + β1e
IMF
1 + u1 = α1α0y−1 + α1β0e
IMF
0 + α1u0 + β1e
IMF
1 + u1
y2 = α2y1 + β2e
IMF
2 + u2 = α2α1α0y−1 + α2α1β0e
IMF
0 + α2α1u0 + α2β1e
IMF





7.4 IRFs à la Auerbach and Gorodnichenko










































Following AG this implies that the impulse response function of a fiscal con-





with H = 5. Similarly in





. In this case, the impulse responses
depend just on the first two initial lags of the LHS variable. They do not take
into account both the change of the dependent variable and the possibility
of the endogenous transition from one state to the other. The correct way
to construct the impulse response functions, considering the moving average
representation, should be for h = 1:
∆yt+1 = (1− F (zt+1)) (1− F (zt)) βE,1eIMFt + (1− F (zt+1))F (zt) βER1,1eIMFt +
+F (zt+1) (1− F (zt)) βR,1eIMFt + (1− F (zt))F (zt+1) βER2,1eIMFt + α1α0∆yt−1 + εt+1.
Hence, one can conclude that in the non-linear case the local projections do
not recover the same IRFs as the conventional approach.
7.5 Monte Carlo Experiment
The goal in this subsection is to conduct a Monte Carlo experiment. The
reason is that I would like to compare the IRFs derived from the STVAR
versus the IRFs from the local projections method, as has been used in the
literature. First, I assume that the STVAR baseline model is the true model,
the data generating process (DGP). This means that I estimate the model
and use the fitted values of the STVAR to generate data. Then, I proceed by
applying the local projections method on the generated data.
34
The algorithm for the Monte Carlo experiment is the following:
Step 1. I first draw an error ∼ N (0,Σ).
Step 2. For time t , from the DGP I generate
 ∆yit∆τ it
∆git
, by taking t − 1
and t− 2 as given.
Step 3. I get the new F (zit) .
Step 4. Repeat 1-3.
In the first round in Step 2, I take the initial two lags as given. The reason
is that the lags of the dependent variable are included both in the controls and
in the regime indicator.
Next, I apply the local projections approach in the data generated to derive
the impulse responses of the variable of interest (e.g. output growth).
Recall that when the impulse responses are estimated by the local projec-
tions method, they depict the average behavior of the economy for each sample
from t to t+ h depending on the shock and the initial state.
7.6 IRFs from the STVAR versus Local Projections
Before moving to the main findings of this discussion, I report the results
that I get from the estimation of a linear VAR. The IRF for the output growth
(Figure 16 in the Appendix) show that a 1% fiscal shock has a recessionary
effect, with the fiscal adjustments based mainly on spending cuts being less
costly in terms of short-run output losses. I get similar results if I use the
local projections method, the IRFs from the two different methods are not
statistically different (Figure 17 in the Appendix). This is in line with what
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) have discussed.
Moving to the STVAR model, first, I discuss the results that I acquire by
using the local projections approach on the data. Then, I look into the results
drawn from the Monte Carlo experiment. To derive the IRFs with the local
projections method, one needs to account for the serial correlation generated in
the regressions from h > 0 and correct the standard errors. Following Ramey
and Zubairy (2018), I use the Newey-West standard errors.
The results for the non-linear model, where I consider just the non-linearities
that arise from the state of the business cycle together with the different com-
position of fiscal shocks (see Figure 18 in the Appendix), indicate that the
shocks occurring during economic downturns seem to be statistically different
compared to the fiscal shocks implemented during periods of economic up-
turns. When a tax-based fiscal consolidation hits the economy during ”good”
35




























Figure 11: Data: IRFS with local projections (solid line with grey shaded area)
versus STVAR.
times, the immediate effect is more recessionary compared to the case of ”bad”
times. Fiscal adjustments based upon taxes when implemented in periods of
expansion have overall on average the most recessionary effect. The tax-based
adjustments implemented in periods of recessions are less recessionary, which
is in accordance with my previous findings. In the case of adjustments com-
posed mainly from taxes, I find evidence of state-dependency. On the other
hand, expenditure-based fiscal consolidations implemented in different periods
are not statistically different. This last result is in line with the findings of
Ramey and Zubairy (2018).
From Figure 11, I observe that the IRFs derived from the two methods
differ. There is evidence that the two curves are statistically different. Only for
the tax-based consolidations in expansions this is not the case, where the two
approaches do not seem to result in statistically different results. The initial
effects are identical, which is in line with what I discussed about the moving
average representation and the fact that for h = 0 the initial effects should
be the same. The response of the output growth with the local projections
method is more erratic in general compared to the conventional approach. This
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Figure 12: Out-of-sample simulation.
is reasonable since the impulse responses with the local projections method are
based on the estimated coefficient of the corresponding period. It is important
to mention that irrespective of the econometric discussion in a theoretical
basis, the conclusions from the two different methods differ. In fact, one can
notice from Figure 18, 19 (in the Appendix) that the state-dependent evidence
that I get from the GIRFs is now reversed.
Finally, I conduct out-of-sample simulations (Figure 12) and compare the
actual realization of GDP growth for the years 2009-2013 to the simulated
ones derived from the STVAR and the local projections.36 It appears that
the simulated STVAR performs better on average and is closer to the actual
output realization compared to the local projections approach.
7.7 Monte Carlo Experiment
The underlying assumption is that the STVAR is the true model, which I
use as the data generating process. In Figure 13, I present just the confidence
intervals of the STVAR, since this is the uncertainty of the true model. The
36Local projections are not used in general for forecasting. I still believe that it is a
reasonable way to compare the fit of the two methods.
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Figure 13: Monte Carlo Experiment: The solid line with the circles depicts the IRFs
derived from the true model (the DGP, i.e. the STVAR) and the true confidence
intervals, while the solid line depicts the IRFS derived with the local projections
method.
size of the initial effects is comparable to the STVAR. The derived IRFs in
this case are not statistically different and the dynamics also seem not to differ
much. One reason may be that the non-linearity introduced is not that strong,
since the GDP growth after a shock does not change much from one year to
the other.37,38
37For this reason, as a simple exercise, I consider conducting the same experiment in the
ISTVAR framework. In this case the non-linearity that arises from the government debt
dynamics is stronger, so it could be interesting to see the difference to the existing findings.
38Further tests for the difference of the IRFs include the one of Olivei and Tenreyro (2010).
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8 Robustness Checks and Additional Tests
In this section I briefly discuss part of the preliminary tests needed regarding
my baseline model specification and the narrative data.39
8.1 Linearity tests
To make sure that the smooth transition regime switching models are
identified, I need to conduct a hypothesis testing of H0: Linear model versus
H1: Logistic STVAR model. I conduct two types of linearity tests. First, I
follow Terasvirta and Yang (2014) and use the LM-type test to compare the
residual sum of squares of the linear model to the ones of a second- or third-
order approximation of the STVAR specification. Then, I use a standard
likelihood ratio test. Both tests are in favor of the non-linear model.
To conduct the linearity test I approximate the logistic function by a
second- or third- order Taylor expansion. The tests show that the non-linear
model performs better compared to the linear model. The values for both the
Akaike criterion and the Schwarz criterion are lower for the non-linear model,
which indicate that it is the preferred model.
Table 4: Linearity Test
Linear Model Non-Linear Model
AIC 4.15 4.06
BIC 4.61 4.5
8.2 Exogeneity of the narrative identified shocks
To investigate whether the identified adjustments are systematically un-
correlated with other developments affecting output, I use a simple test of
exogeneity: the Granger causality test. More precisely, I regress the narrative
identified adjustments on the lag of output growth, and augment by including
lagged values of the narrative measures. If the past variables are not able
39Further details of the tests and results as well as further robustness checks are available
upon request.
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to predict a shift in the components of spending or taxes, then the shift is
considered to be exogenous.
The results of the Granger causality tests that I run for each country and
for each component show that, in most of the cases, the null hypothesis that
the past variables predict the narrative measures is rejected. For Sweden and
the Netherlands, I am not able to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, I
decided to drop these countries from my analysis.
9 Concluding Remarks
The effect of fiscal austerity during economic downturns is the Gordian
knot of policy discussions. In this paper I contribute to the empirical literature
of fiscal policy in two ways. First, I propose a general encompassing model
to assess the relevance of non-linearities regarding the output effects of fiscal
shocks. I focus on three types of non-linearities simultaneously, related to the
“how” a fiscal adjustment is implemented, “when” and the “initial condition”
of the economy. The joint study of the initial condition, namely the debt-ratio
of the economy, with the other two non-linearities, captures the novelty of this
paper. And, indeed, I find that debt matters for the implementation of fiscal
policy.
I examine the potential asymmetric responses of fiscal consolidations by
allowing a non-linearity on the state of the economy, the composition of the
fiscal adjustments and the government’s budget fiscal position. I propose an
Interacted STVAR aiming to study these asymmetries. In general, policies
implemented through expenditure-based adjustments seem to harm the econ-
omy less and work effectively. They are able to stabilize, and even reduce the
government debt. The picture is different when I look into a composition of
policies based on tax increases. The distortionary flavour that taxes poten-
tially may have, generates an opposite effect from what the government of
a country would desire. The effect of tax-based adjustments is, on average,
the most recessionary. When debt is high, by increasing taxes the fiscal au-
thority fails to stabilize the debt-ratio. However, when the authority decides
to cut public expenditure during a good period, the debt-ratio is stabilized
and the effect on output growth is negligible. The heterogeneous response of
the expenditure-based consolidations implemented during good periods when
debt is high is an interesting policy implication that should be examined fur-
ther. In addition, the evidence of the asymmetries between low and high ratios
of debt should be evaluated to understand the channels of the transmission
40
mechanism. For example, it could be important to control for a component
of monetary policy, particularly when interest rates are close to the zero lower
bound, and possibly study a related theoretical model.
Furthermore, I address some key problems in the econometrics of the ex-
isting literature. More precisely, I discuss the potential pitfalls of the use of
the local projections method in the fiscal policy literature. I prove that the
IRFs derived from the conventional approach are not the same as those derived
from the local projections approach. When I compare the IRFs derived from
the two approaches, the two seem to differ and lead to completely different
policy conclusions. Nevertheless, in my Monte Carlo experiments, my findings
indicate that they are not statistically different.
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Appendix A: Debt
I will discuss econometrically why it is important to include debt. The
reason is simple, omitting debt may deliver biased estimates. The aim is to
estimate the effect of fiscal adjustments on the output growth. As I discussed
in Section 3, the records of the fiscal adjustments are identified in a way that
they are exogenous to the business cycle. However, they depend on one key
motivation. The motivation is to decrease the government’s deficit. Assume
a simple model, with a focus just on output growth. Suppose that the true
model is the following
∆yt = α + β ·Debtt−1 + γ · eIMFt + εt.
I can reasonably assume that both β < 0 and γ < 0. The latter can be
seen also from Figure 12 for the linear case and from Figure 13 for the state-
dependent case, where the effect of fiscal consolidations had a recessionary
effect on output growth. At the same time, I have that
eIMFt = κ ·Debtt−1 + υt,
where κ > 0, given the motivation of the fiscal adjustments. If I combine the
two equations,
∆yt = α + (
β
κ
+ γ) · eIMFt + νt
it is clear that if one considers just the fiscal adjustments, this would imply
an overestimation of the effect ( (β
κ
+ γ) < 0 ). Intuitively, in this case, one
could also think that the stabilization feedback effect to the system, arising
from debt, is missing.
Appendix B: Proofs of MA representation
Proof of Lemma 1. I proceed by induction.
Initial Step. t = 0. By (6), y0 = α0y−1 + u0 = u0 + α0y−1. At the same time,
note that φ0,0 =
∏0
s=0+1 αs = 1 and φ−1,0 =
∏0





φτ ,0uτ + φ−1,0y−1.
Inductive Step. The statement is true for t. I next show it holds for t+ 1. By
45
(6) and inductive hypothesis, it follows that






































































φτ ,t+1uτ + φ−1,t+1y−1.
By induction, the statement follows. 
Proof of Lemma 2. For each t ∈ N0 define
ũt = βte
IMF
t + ut. (8)
By (7), I have
yt = αtyt−1 + ũt ∀t ∈ N0.









αs ∀τ ∈ {−1, 0, . . . , t} .














proving the statement. 
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Appendix C: Figures








































Figure 14: Cumulative GIRFs for the Fiscal STVAR with LOW Debt: The re-
sponses of taxes and government spending on a tax-based shock or an expenditute-
based shock in recessions or expansions when the Debt-ratio is low.
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TB shock: GIRF of Gov. Spending







EB shock: GIRF of Gov. Spending
Figure 15: Cumulative GIRFs for the Fiscal STVAR with HIGH Debt: The re-
sponses of taxes and government spending on a tax-based shock or an expenditute-
based shock in recessions or expansions when the Debt-ratio is high.









Figure 16: GIRF for the Linear 3-variate VAR: The output responce on a tax-based
(red); expenditure-based (blue) fiscal adjustment
48







Figure 17: IRFs from Linear 3-variate VAR versus Linear Local Projections
(bold lines): The output responce on a tax-based (red); expenditure-based
(blue) fiscal adjustment










Output growth response to Fiscal shock



























TB in Expansion and Recession









EB in Expansion and Recession
Figure 18: GIRF for the STVAR: EB and TB fiscal adjustments in Recessions and
Expansions and the endogenous response of Fz
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TB shock on GDP







EB shock on GDP
Figure 19: Data: IRFs derived with local projections.
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